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Abstract
Why do some societies fail to adopt more efficient institutions? And why do such
failures often coincide with cultural movements that glorify the past? We propose a
model highlighting the interplay—or lack thereof—between institutional change and
cultural beliefs. The main insight is that institutional change by itself will not lead
to a more efficient economy unless culture evolves in tandem. This is because institu-
tional change can be countered by changes in cultural values complementary to a more
“traditional” economy. In our model, forward-looking elites, who benefit from a tra-
ditional, inefficient economy, may over-provide public goods that are complementary
to the production of traditional goods. This encourages individuals to transmit cul-
tural beliefs complementary to the provision of traditional goods. A horse race results
between institutions, which evolve towards a more efficient (less traditional) economy,
and cultural norms, which are pulled towards “tradition” by the elites. When culture
wins the horse race, institutions respond by giving more political power to traditional
elites—even if in doing so more efficient institutions are left behind. We call the inter-
action between these cultural and institutional dynamics a cultural revival.
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1 Introduction
Why do some societies fail to adopt more efficient institutions? Why do institutional changes
towards a more productive economy sometimes stop dead in their tracks, igniting a reversal
in the opposite direction? History is replete with instances of societies turning their backs
on more efficient economic outcomes. For instance, Chaney (2016) studies the decline of
Islamic science, finding that the decline began in the 12th and 13th centuries and that sci-
entific learning was replaced by more traditional modes of religious education in madrasas.
Squicciarini (2019) finds that the Catholic Church promoted a highly anti-scientific school
curriculum in the late-19th century, just as the returns to secular education were rising in
the midst of the Second Industrial Revolution. Carvalho and Koyama (2016) and Carvalho,
Koyama and Sacks (2017) find that ultra-Orthodox European Jews responded to emancipa-
tion in the 19th century by imposing unprecedented restrictions on secular education, further
closing themselves off from society.
These examples highlight a curious, yet ubiquitous phenomenon: the rejection of in-
stitutional change is frequently coupled with a cultural revival of traditional values. We
conceptualize cultural revivals as movements in which the dominant cultural norms shift
from those that are complementary with highly productive economic activity (given the
state of technology) to those that complement less productive economic activity. Cultural
revivals may occur in spite of institutional change favoring a more efficient economy. They
may, in fact, induce institutional regression towards a less efficient economy.
Macro-level examples of cultural revivals abound in the historical record. They include
the famed “social decay” of the late Roman Empire, the inward turns of Qing China and
Shogunate Japan in response to contact with Europe, and British unpreparedness for World
War I. These examples are all reflective of societies built on cultural beliefs associated with
past glory but ill-suited for a much changed world.1
1More generally, Boyd and Richerson (1985, p. 40) note that “historians, sociologists, and anthropologists have
found a number of striking examples of cultural inertia, situations in which cultural ancestry is important
in changed situations or where traditional cultural differences persist in similar environments.”
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In this paper, we present a theory to explain why such cultural and institutional reversals
arise. Our main insight is that cultural values conducive to economic growth may fail to
develop if “traditional” elites anticipate losing their political power as a result. The reason
is that these traditional elites use their political power to over-provide public goods that
benefit citizens with traditional cultural values. This encourages traditional cultural values
to spread throughout the population, which in turn encourages institutional change toward
a less efficient economy. The model therefore reveals how self-interested elites can set in
motion—via indoctrination—institutional changes that favor their interests despite the fact
that they have no capacity to directly alter institutions.2 Moreover, traditional elites have
even greater incentive to set in motion a cultural revival after a shock which increases the
efficiency of the other sector in the economy. Thus, our model reveals how positive, exogenous
economic or technological shocks may end up negatively impacting economic development.
In our model, elites provide public goods that complement production by civil society.
These public goods are subject to an externality, which arises because elites and civil so-
ciety have preferences that are not aligned, yet the choices of the former impinge on the
decisions of the latter. We model institutional change as a slow process subject to frictions,
uncertainties and shocks. However, to the extent that institutional change helps to internal-
ize the aforementioned externality, it does so by redistributing political power to elites so
that their preferences are more aligned with the cultural composition of society. Hence, a
“horse race” can arise between institutions and culture. Institutions move towards a more
efficient outcome on one trajectory, while forward-looking elites may use public good provi-
sion to indoctrinate civil society, pulling culture along the opposite trajectory. When culture
wins the horse race, a cultural revival occurs, because both cultural values and (eventually)
institutions associated with the traditional economy become predominant.3
2This logic is consistent with a large literature that views institutions as exogenous to all players at any given
point in time but endogenous to their actions over time (North 1981, 1991; Greif and Laitin 2004; Greif 2006;
Kuran 2011; Alston et al. 2016; Bisin and Verdier 2017).
3Our theoretical insight has similar features to the one proposed by Be´nabou, Ticchi and Vindigni (2016),
who develop a theory of the role religion can play in preventing scientific progress. Whereas they focus on
the content of religious beliefs and the threat that certain technologies pose to those beliefs, we focus on the
2
Our model departs from—and adds to—the standard political economy explanation of
institutional calcification, in which stagnation occurs when it is in the interest of the polit-
ically powerful for the status quo to prevail (Acemoglu 2003; North, Wallis and Weingast
2009; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 2012; Blaydes and Chaney 2013). This view is rooted in
North’s idea that a society’s formal institutions—those political, legal, social, and economic
mechanisms that establish the formal “rules of the game” and the incentives faced by the
players therein—are the key drivers of economic and political outcomes. The “formal insti-
tutions of political economy” view clearly explains many cases of economic and institutional
stagnation. Yet, it cannot explain why cultural backlashes are so often linked to institutional
stagnation and how such cultural changes can come to impinge upon a society’s institutions.
The goal of this paper is to provide such an explanation.
This paper is not the first one in economics to suggest an interaction between culture and
institutions, although it is the first, to our knowledge, to present a theory of how cultural
backlashes can nullify the economic benefits of institutional change.4 Indeed, some recent
papers are particularly relevant to our hypothesis. The theory paper most similar to ours is
Bisin and Verdier (2017), who also study the co-evolution of institutions and culture. They
argue that culture and institutions may act as complements or substitutes. In the former
(latter) case, the interaction of the two strengthens (weakens) the equilibrium patterns and
institutions are more (less) likely to produce their desired effect. Bisin et al. (2018) use a
similar framework to study the joint evolution of religious norms and institutions, and their
effect on technology adoption, political decentralization, and military conquests. While we
build off of many of the insights of the workhorse model of Bisin and Verdier (2017), the key
difference between our two models is that we are interested in understanding how traditional
interaction between institutional and cultural composition of society independent of the content of beliefs.
Hence, the two views are highly complementary and help explain different, although related, phenomena.
4For overviews of recent developments of various aspects of this literature, see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2006), Nunn (2012), Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013), Algan and Cahuc (2014), and Alesina and Giuliano
(2015).
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values and beliefs can become more prevalent in reaction to institutional changes that are
not particularly amenable to such values and beliefs.
A growing literature studies the effect of forward-looking cultural leaders on the evolution
of identity. In Verdier and Zenou (2018), cultural leaders exploit their knowledge of cultural
dynamics in setting their public good provision strategy.5 They show that leaders may en-
gage in excessive cultural competition, as they benefit from larger groups. Seror (2018) seeks
to explain the persistence of religious prohibitions implemented by cultural leaders. Relat-
edly, Hauk and Mueller (2015) consider a model of cultural conflict where cultural leaders
supply and interpret culture, while Prummer and Siedlarek (2017) studies the persistent
differences in cultural traits of immigrant groups with the presence of community leaders.
Our main contribution relative to this literature is to consider forward-looking political elites
that internalize the joint dynamics of culture and institutions in their decisions, instead of
assuming institutions to be fixed and exogenous.6 This is hardly a trivial issue; setbacks and
reversals in modern institutional development are a primary reason for the failure of lag-
gard economies to converge with the leaders (North 1981; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
2001, 2005; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004; Greif 2006; Kuran 2011; Acemoglu and
Robinson 2012; Rubin 2017). Our paper addresses precisely this point.
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the generalized model.
Section 3 reveals the intuition regarding why and how cultural revivals emerge, and Section
4 offers some concluding thoughts.
5See as well Bisin and Verdier (2000) on forward-looking leaders in a political economy context.
6Two other related articles are Giuliano and Nunn (2017) and Acemoglu and Jackson (2017). Giuliano and
Nunn (2017) show that, consistent with the anthropology literature, societies tend to emphasize traditional
values more in relatively stable and predictable environments. They find a negative correlation between
negative economic shocks and traditional values both cross-sectionally and intertemporally. Acemoglu and
Jackson (2017) investigate the co-evolution of social norms and the enforcement of codified laws. They argue
that laws which are in conflict with prevailing social norms may be counterproductive; it is only when such
laws are gradually introduced that they are effective. This insight is a subset of the more general findings of
our model, which can also account for why societies become more traditional in response to a shock.
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2 The Model
We start by assuming there are two types of agents in the economy: elites and civil society.
Based on the optimal behavior and interactions of the elites and civil society, there are differ-
ent paths of institutional evolution and cultural change that achieve economic development.
2.1 Civil Society
We consider two cultural types, type 1 and type 2. Given a continuum [0, 1] of agents,
we denote qt the fraction of agents of type 1 in period t. Agents live for two periods. In
the first period of their life, they are young. They make no strategic decisions, and they
receive cultural norms from their parents. In the second period, agents are adults. They
first realize their cultural type and have one offspring. Then, they choose to consume various
commodities and to invest time and resources in order to transmit their cultural type to their
offspring. At the end of period 2 the adults are replaced by the new generation of adults,
and so forth.
Additionally, there are two types of public goods, g1 and g2. We consider agents within
civil society as producing units and maximizing consumption. They combine time, market
goods, and public goods via production functions in order to produce commodities and to
raise their offspring. Following Becker (1965), we denote Zik the production of commodity k
by an agent of type i, with:
Zik = fk(τ
i
k, x
i
k, {g1, g2}), (1)
where τ ik is the time devoted to the production of Z
i
k, x
i
k a vector of market goods, and
k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with m the number of goods produced by an agent. The production function
fk is assumed increasing and concave. Agents of type i use the public goods g
1 and g2 for
consumption and production.
Similarly, we assume that by devoting time and resources to their offspring, parents can
increase the likelihood of transmitting their own cultural type. We denote dit the probability
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that a parent is successful in transmitting his cultural type, with
dit = h
i(τ id, x
i
d, g
i
t). (2)
The function h is increasing in τ id, x
i
d, and g
i
t, while it is concave in all of its arguments. The
parameter τ id denotes the time devoted to child rearing, and x
i
d a vector of resources, e.g.
toys, food, and so forth.7 We assume that the utility of an agent of type i takes the following
form:
U i = U ip(Z
i
1, . . . , Z
i
M) + αEuic(dit)
= U i(τ i1, . . . τ
i
m, x
i
1, . . . , x
i
M , {g1, g2}) + αEuic(hi(τ id, xid, git))
(3)
An adult derives utility U ip from his own private consumption, as he devotes time and re-
sources to produce a set of commodities {Zi1, . . . , ZiM}. The parent also displays altruism,
and α > 0 denotes the weight of the child’s welfare in the parent’s objective function. The
expected utility of the child is denoted Euic, and it depends on the resources the parent
devotes to child rearing.
Each agent maximizes his utility function by choosing the time and resources devoted to
child rearing and to private consumption. Each agent faces a budget constraint, with
e(τ i1, . . . τ
i
m, x
i
1, . . . x
i
M ; τ
i
d, x
i
d) ≤ W (4)
denoting the expenditure function of an agent of type i, with W being his full income.8 We
denote ui(g1, g2) the indirect utility of an agent of type i.
7See Seror (2019) for a more general theory of child development in rearing interactions.
8Becker (1965) demonstrates that the problem can be simplified to that of maximization of a utility function
subject to a unique budget constraint.
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2.2 Elites
The provision of good gi depends on the society’s prevailing institutions. In particular, it
depends on the political strength of the society’s elites. Elites have a vested interest in the
provision of particular types of public goods. For instance, merchants desire protection of
property rights as well as transport infrastructure (North 1981; Acemoglu and Robinson
2012), military elites desire spending on defense (Tilly 1990; Hoffman 2015), religious au-
thorities advocate for spending on religious infrastructure and education (possibly to the
detriment of spending on secular public education; see Gill (1998), Cos¸gel and Miceli (2009),
Chaudhary and Rubin (2016), and Rubin (2017)), and elites in “dying” industries may push
for subsidies or tariffs to revitalize their industry (e.g., coal mining in the United States).
There are two types of elites, i ∈ {1, 2}, corresponding to the public good in which they
have a vested interest in providing. We conceptualize each type of elite as having a political
weight which reflects the relative political bargaining power of each party. As we will show
below, this can be conceptualized as the weights given to each player in a nonsymmetric
Nash bargaining game (Kalai 1977).
The political weight of the elites of type 1 is denoted λt ∈ [0, 1]. Each type of elite
is forward-looking with a three-period time horizon. As will become clear, the fact that
elites are forward-looking is crucial for the model’s intuition and solution. However, the
assumption that their time horizon is only three periods is not crucial—it is a simplifying
assumption that does not drive any result.9
Elites bargain over the available resources. We denote r > 0 the total resources available
to the elites in period t. These resources are comprised of tax collection, fruits of landed
9Any time horizon that exceeds that of non-elites would yield the same qualitative results. Since individuals
in civil society live for two periods, a minimum of three periods is needed so that cultural and institutional
decisions have sufficient time to interact. A longer time horizon would yield the same results so long as the
discount factor, δ, is not sufficiently large. When δ is very large, elites are forward-looking enough to only
care about the steady state, and cultural revivals thus do not occur. Since we have no intuition regarding
the discount factor, we chose to favor parsimony rather than have additional qualifications on the results.
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estates, and other forms of income, e.g. natural resources windfalls. Elites have utility:
U et = u
e
t + δ Euet+1 + δ2 Euet+2, (5)
with
uet = log([v(g
1
t )− v(0)]λt [v(g2t )− v(0)]1−λt), (6)
and v(0) = 0, v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0. The parameter δ > 0 is a discount factor. The bargaining
powers of the elites are assumed equal to their political weights. In other words, the weighted
utilities of the elites laid out in (6) reflect a Nash bargain between the two types of elites.10
In any period t, the elites bargain over the optimal allocation of public goods (g1t , g
2
t ),
given the budget constraint
g1t + g
2
t ≤ r. (7)
Elites also internalize how their choices will affect their future bargaining power, as the
current public good provision affects future institutions and the cultural composition.
In any period t, agents in civil society seek to maximize their objective function (3)
by choosing their private consumption, as well as the time and resources devoted to child
rearing. Similarly, the elites engage in a Nash bargain over the provision of good 1 and good
2. Based on the optimal behavior and interactions of the elites and civil society, there are
different paths of institutional building and cultural change, as we explain next.
10While we abstract from rulers and their role in society and the political bargain, one can easily incorporate
them into this framework. In particular, one can consider a ruler with a time horizon that is similar to the
elites and one who collects rents based on taxation on economic activity. Its political survival could also be
endogenous with respect to its actions. Their ability to set (tax) policy could be dependent on the Nash
bargain between the elites and the ruler. Nonetheless, as long as the ruler’s objective involves survival and
maximization of tax revenue, the optimal behavior of such a ruler would be to accommodate the cultural
and institutional dynamics that evolve based on the forces we outline in the model.
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2.3 Cultural Dynamics
Socialization: As in Bisin and Verdier (2001), socialization is modeled as the result of
direct vertical (parental) and horizontal/oblique socialization in society at large.11 Vertical
socialization to the parent’s trait i ∈ {1, 2} occurs with probability dit, and if that fails the
child receives a trait (horizontally) from someone in the population at random. We write
the child’s expected utility as:
Euic(dit) = {dit + (1− dit)qt}u(g1,et+1, g2,et+1) + (1− dit)(1− qt)u. (8)
With probability dit + (1− dit)qt, the child is socialized by an agent of type i and will derive
a utility u(g1,et+1, g
2,e
t+1) when adult. The parameter g
i,e
t+1 denotes the parent’s expectation of
the provision of good i in the following period (when the parent won’t be alive). With
probability (1− dit)(1− qt), the child is socialized by an agent of type j 6= i. In this case, in
the eyes of his parent, the child is expected to derive lower utility, which by assumption is
equal to a constant u ≥ 0, with u < u(g1,et+1, g2,et+1).12
Indoctrination: Next, we assume that public good provision affects the efficiency of agents
to transmit their cultural type. More specifically, we assume that there is a complementarity
between the provision of good gi, and the productivity of the investments in child rearing
made by an agent of type i:
∂2hi
∂τ id∂g
i
t
> 0, and
∂2hi
∂xid∂g
i
t
> 0. (9)
As a simple illustration, it may be easier for parents to transmit a traditional religious
identity if the state subsidizes religious education.
11Vertical, horizontal, and oblique transmission are the core mechanisms in the dual-inheritance theory of
cultural evolution. For more, see Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), Boyd and Richerson (1985), Bisin and
Verdier (2009), and Henrich (2015).
12This modeling choice is made for simplicity, and relates to the imperfect empathy assumption of Bisin and
Verdier (2001). Micro-foundations of this assumption can be found in Seror (2019).
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Complementarity between Private Consumption and Public Good Provision:
Finally, we assume that:
∂U ip
∂gj
=

φi > 0 if i = j
0 otherwise.
(10)
In words, type i agents value a higher provision of good gi, while good j 6= i does not
affect their consumption and production choices. As an illustration, higher education and
economic integration are valued by individuals that seek to make a living in the modern
economy, while it has limited impact on the traditional way of living.
We deduce the following trajectory of cultural change (all proofs are in Appendix A):
Proposition 1 (Cultural Change):
• In any period t, the fraction of type 1 agents change, so that:
qt+1 = qt + qt(1− qt)(d1t − d2t ). (11)
• In period t + 1, the fraction of agents of type 1, qt+1, is positively affected by the
provision of good (g1t ), by the marginal utility of good 1 (φ
1), and is negatively affected
by the provision of good (g2t ), and by the marginal utility of good 2 (φ
2).
Proof. The proof is available in Appendix A.1.
From (9), a higher provision of good 1 increases the time and resources that type 1 agents
devote to child rearing. Hence, these agents are more successful in transmitting their trait
and qt+1 is greater. Alternatively, from (9) again, a higher provision of good 2 incentivizes
the agents of type 2 to devote more time and resources to child rearing. Hence, type 2 agents
are more successful in passing their trait, and qt+1 decreases.
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2.4 Institutional Dynamics
In accordance with a large literature, we conceptualize institutions as mechanisms which gen-
erate regularities of behavior through the aggregation and implementation of social choices
(North 1981, 1990; David 1994; Greif 2006). In the spirit of Greif and Laitin (2004) and
Bisin and Verdier (2017), institutions are considered exogenous to individuals at any given
point in time, but the actions taken by those individuals result in endogenous institutional
change over time.
In this economy, an externality problem is implied by the player’s optimal choices. The
choices of g1t and g
2
t affect the utility derived by civil society, as the public goods complement
the utility of the agents differently. Hence, in a society where the majority of the population
belongs to type 1, a weak provision of good g1t is not socially efficient, as the majority of
the agents prefer to use good g1t in their own private production, consumption, and cultural
transmission investments. Hence, social efficiency depends on the cultural composition of
the population, qt.
We model institutions as changing to reduce this externality, albeit subject to frictions
and shocks. Institutional change reduces the externality by redistributing political power to
elites so that their preferences are more aligned with the cultural composition of society. We
therefore express institutional dynamics as follows:
λt+1 = λt + t + ηz(qt). (12)
In equation (12), the stochastic term t is drawn from a distribution F (.) that takes
support on the real line with E(t) = 0. Hence, we assume that institutions follow a random
walk, save for the role of institutional change in the final term on the right-hand side of
equation (12).
The parameter η ≥ 0 denotes the social friction coefficient. It captures the idea that
institutions are deeply ingrained features of society and do not respond immediately to
11
outside stimuli (North 1991; Greif 2006). The function z(qt) is related to the degree of
social efficiency, given the strategic decisions made by the agents and elites in period t.
Specifically, if z(qt) > 0, then it is socially efficient to empower elites of type 1. Reciprocally,
when z(qt) < 0, then it is socially efficient to empower elites of type 2. We assume that the
function qt → z(qt) is increasing and concave. Institutions evolve so as to achieve a higher
degree of social efficiency, as an increase in the fraction of agents of type 1 (resp. 2) leads to
greater bargaining power of the elites of type 1 (resp. 2), and hence to a higher provision of
public good 1 (resp. 2).13
With this formulation, we posit that institutions may evolve—however slowly—so as
to achieve a higher degree of social efficiency over time. Importantly, we do not assume
that institutions are always efficient or are moving society towards efficient outcomes (as
in North and Thomas 1973, North 1981). As well, such a formulation also leaves room for
vested interests to move institutions away from their optimal state (as in Kuran 2011; Rubin
2011, 2017).
The following results are established by solving the optimization problems of the agents
and the elites. In any period t, the elites Nash bargain over the allocation of the two public
goods, as they maximize (5), under the budget constraint (7), and internalize both the
cultural dynamics (11) and the institutional dynamics (12). Simultaneously, civil society
agents choose the time and resources they devote to private consumption and child rearing,
as they maximize their utility (3), subject to their budget constraint (4).
Proposition 2 (Institutional Change): Given that the magnitude of the frictions in
institutional change is sufficiently large (i.e. η is sufficiently small):
• When the bargaining power of the elites (λt, 1 − λt) are balanced, then there exists
several possible trajectories of institutional change.
13For example, it could be that z(qt) =
∂
∂g1t
[qtu
1(g1t , g
2
t ) + (1− qt)u2(g1t , g2t )]. In this case, if ∂∂g1t {qtu
1(g1t , g
2
t ) +
(1 − qt)u2(g1t , g2t )} > 0, on average, and at the margin, civil society positively values good 1. Hence, civil
society aspires to a higher provision of good 1. This would eventually translate into institutional changes
that empower type 1 elites, given the frictions η and stochastic institutional changes t.
12
• When one type of elite is sufficiently more powerful than the other, and absent large
shocks t, institutions necessarily reinforce the political power of the strong type of elite
after a finite period of time.
Proof. The proof is available in Appendix A.2.
In order to understand why—and under which conditions— Proposition 2 holds, we can
write the first-order condition associated with the maximization program of the elites as:
λt
v′(g1t )
v(g1t )
− (1− λt)v
′(g2t )
v(g2t )
+ δ2ηz′(qt+1(λet+2))
∂qt+1
∂g1t
[log(v(g1,et+2(λ
e
t+2))− log(v(g2,et+2(λet+2))] = 0,
(13)
given that g1τ + g
2
τ = r, for τ ∈ {t, t+ 1, t+ 2}, and qt+1 is given by (11). Additionally, λet+2
denotes the expectations of the elites about the institutions of period t + 2, and g1,et+2(λ
e
t+2)
is the expected provision of good 1 in period t+ 2.14
The elites bargain over the provision of the two types of public goods. The first term in
the first-order condition above gives the marginal value for the elites of type 1 (in period t)
from a higher provision of good 1, given their political weight λt. The second term gives the
marginal cost for the elites of type 2 (in period t) from a higher provision of good 1, given
their political weight 1 − λt. Additionally, the elites care about their future bargaining, as
they internalize that cultural values change over time and that institutions are responsive
to the society’s cultural composition. Hence, they internalize that a marginal increase in
the provision of good 1 in period t will marginally increase the fraction of agents of type 1,
as ∂qt+1
∂g1t
> 0. In turn, this will also affect what constitutes a socially efficient institutional
change in period t + 2, making it more favorable to the agents and to the elites of type 1,
as z′(qt+1) > 0. The elites of type 1 may, therefore, have an incentive to over-provide good
1. By doing so, they stem the tide of cultural change, and align the future social efficiency
with their own interests. Of course, the reverse holds true for elites of type 2.
14Given that elites are heterogeneous, expectations in period t could aggregate as follows: λet+2 = λtλ
1,e
t+2 +
(1 − λt)λ2,et+2, with λi,et+2 the expectations of the elites of type i ∈ {1, 2}. However, since expectations are
rational, both types of elites have identical expectations. Hence, this boils down to λet+2.
13
Crucially, the willingness of elites to align future social efficiency with their own interests
depends on the expectations that they form about the future. Elites who expect to be more
powerful in the future are more willing to bargain over the allocation of resources in the
current period. They internalize that this will serve their future interests, by affecting the
course of cultural and institutional change. Therefore, cultural and institutional changes
depend on the expectations of the elites about their future political influence. There ex-
ists only a few possible trajectories of cultural and institutional changes, with self-fulfilling
expectations, that solves the following fixed point equation:
λt+2 = λt+1 + t+1 + ηz(qt+1(λ
e
t+2)), (14)
with qt+1(λ
e
t+2) denoting the fraction of agents of type 1 in period t + 1. The optimal
provision of public goods depends on the expectations of the elites. Therefore, the efforts
that parents invest in child rearing also depends on the expectations of the elites about the
future institutions, and so does qt+1.
This intuition helps explain Proposition 2. Regarding the first result in Proposition 2,
when the political weights of the elites are initially balanced, it is not clear to the elites who
will hold more power in the future. In particular, it could be that despite being less powerful
in period t, one type of elites can rationally expect to reverse the tide of social efficiency.
Several trajectories of institutional and cultural change are possible where the expectations of
the elites are self-fulfilling. One type of elites may increase its political bargaining over time,
in spite of cultural values that are initially antagonistic to such changes. The fixed point
equation (14) may admit several equilibria, as represented in the upper panel of Figure 1.
The black curve represents the RHS of (14), while the dotted blue line represents the LHS. As
represented, there are three intersections between the two curves. The extreme intersections
(points A and C) represent stable equilibria. One of these stable solutions can be such that
a reversal in the trajectory of institutions emerges.15
15Depending on the functional forms v(.) and z(.), more than two stable solutions may exist.
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Figure 1: Solutions of the fixed point equation (14) for balanced political weights (upper
panel), and unbalanced political weights (lower panel)
A
B
C
RHS/LHS of (14)
λt+2
RHS/LHS of (14)
λt+2
C
Note: the black curve is the RHS of (14), and the dotted blue line is the LHS of (14).
The second result in Proposition 2 follows from the simple observation that elites aspire
to keep political power. By changing the course of cultural change, powerful elites may
achieve such an outcome, in spite of cultural values that may, initially, be antagonistic to
them. Powerful elites are always successful in turning the tide of what constitutes socially
efficient institutional change as they align cultural values with their own interests. Since
they expect to keep their power—and absent large shocks, t—they rationally over-provide
their preferred public good. After a finite period of time, prevailing cultural values become
congruent with the dominant elites’ interests. As represented in the lower panel of Figure
15
1, when λt+1 increases, the black curve shifts upward, as it represents the RHS of (14).
Therefore, when type 1 elites are strong, only one possible trajectory for institutions is
possible, where λt remains relatively high, as represented by point C on Figure 1. Similarly,
if we were to consider the case of powerful elites of type 2, then the solid black line would
shift down sufficiently so as to yield only equilibrium A in Figure 1.
3 Cultural Revivals and the Joint Dynamics of Culture
and Institutions
The model established in Section 2 allows us to gain insight into cultural revivals. We
conceptualize cultural revivals as movements in which the dominant cultural norms shift
from those that are more productive to those that are less productive. In the context of the
model, this might take the form of a cultural shift from type 2 to type 1 despite φ1 < φ2.
Once such a cultural shift begins, institutions will eventually follow suit until institutions
and culture reinforce each other at a sub-optimal equilibrium. Why would culture move
towards a less efficient outcome? Our model provides some insight, but first we provide
further motivation with historical examples.
3.1 Cultural Revivals
Cultural revivals are often associated with the ascendance of religious elites. Squicciarini
(2019) provides a prototypical example. She finds that the Catholic Church responded
to the second wave of industrialization in the 19th century by imposing an anti-scientific
curriculum in Catholic schools, which harmed the economic outcomes of students in highly
Catholic regions of France. Much as in our model, elites (the Church) altered cultural norms
by investing in public goods provision (schools). This shifted the institutional and cultural
paths against the headwinds of modernization in highly Catholic regions of France. This is
precisely how we conceptualize cultural revivals.
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Cultural revivals need not be associated with solely religious elites, however. Iyigun
and Rubin (2017) study macro-level cultural revivals in the 17th-century Ottoman Empire,
19th-century Imperial China, and 18th–19th century Tokugawa Japan. Only in the first of
these cases were religious elites important in facilitating the cultural revival. In each of these
cases, rulers and elites were confronted with Western institutions and technologies that had
the potential to upend the economic and social order. In the context of our model, the old
political, military, and economic elite had cultural values complementary to the production of
“traditional” goods, such as tımars or waqf in the Ottoman Empire or Confucian education
in Imperial China and Tokugawa Japan (i.e., those vested in good 1). Meanwhile, certain
types of merchants, producers, and others with access to capital but not social prestige or
political power had values consistent with good 2 (i.e., where φ1 < φ2). This latter group
would have seen their returns rise immensely with the adoption of Western technologies,
education, and institutions. Yet, in each of these cases, the reaction to the West was what
we call a “cultural revival”: cultural values favoring the established elites became more
predominant in society, and institutions did not change to accommodate the new economic
realities. Indeed, institutions ended up supporting the interests of the established elites all
the more. We provide more detail for each of these historical cases in Appendix B.
In each of these examples, one set of institutions and culture had the potential to become
more economically efficient, but culture and institutions evolved jointly in the opposite di-
rection. Reform attempts, when they eventually came, had a clear and explicit objective of
promoting and restoring traditional ways and methods. How can we explain such behavior?
Clearly, efficiency arguments do not suffice (e.g., North and Thomas 1973). These societies
all turned their backs on a more efficient economy, instead becoming more traditional and
less efficient. Moreover, institutional stagnation due to vested interests cannot fully explain
these phenomena (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; 2006), since they do not explain why
the society’s broader culture also became more traditional and opposition to new institu-
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tional organizations or technologies were broad among all segments of society—and not just
among, and driven by, the elites.
We now turn back to the model to help shed light on how and why cultural revivals can
emerge. Again, we assume that φ1 < φ2. That is, good 2 is relatively more valuable in
private consumption, and also more efficient in helping the agents to transmit their cultural
type. We might call the cultural norms associated with good 1 “traditional.” There can exist
multiple equilibria in such a setting: one in which elites mostly provide good 1 and cultural
norms are consistent with good 1, and one in which this is the case for good 2. In order
to understand the conditions under which a cultural revival may occur, we assume that the
economy is not at a steady state in period t, and cultural norm 2 is relatively ascendant.
We want to understand the conditions under which a cultural revivial emerges. In period
t, if the culture of type 2 is relatively ascendant (i.e., q < 1/2), but the institutions of type
1 dominate (i.e., λ > 1/2), there will be downward pressure on the institutional trajectory
(i.e., z < 0). However, if good 1 is invested in sufficiently by elites, the cultural trajectory
will favor good 1 (i.e., q increases). A “horse race” between culture and institutions ensues.
When culture “wins” the horse race, the long-run steady state equilibrium is one in which
culture and institutions complementary to good 1 are predominant. This is what we call a
cultural revival. Formally, we define a cultural revival as:
Definition 1 A Cultural Revival occurs when z(qt) < 0 and λt+1 < λt, but z(qt+1) > 0
and λt+2 > λt+1, because qt+1 increases sufficiently between periods t and t+ 1.
When the political weights of the elites are initially balanced, then the joint evolution
of culture and institutions is less predictable. As shown in Proposition 2, there can be
several trajectories of institutional change. In some of these trajectories, cultural revivals
arise, as the dominant cultural norms shift from those that are more productive to those
that are less productive. The existence of cultural revivals crucially depends on the horse
race that is triggered between institutions and culture. As represented in Figure 2, cultural
values associated with good 2 are relatively ascendant prior to period t (i.e. q decreases
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before period t). Similarly, the institutions associated with good 2 are relatively ascendant
prior period t, and λ decreases. “Traditional” institutions and cultural values are declining in
relevance. However, type 1 elites may rationally expect to reverse the tide of social efficiency,
by affecting cultural composition. Indeed, it may be optimal for the elites of type 1 to over-
provide good 1, so that q increases between periods t and t+ 1, qt+1 > qt, as represented in
Figure 2. Between periods t and t+ 1, culture and institutions evolve in opposite directions,
as represented in the figure. If the changes in the cultural composition are significant enough
relative to the opposite changes in institutions, then the tide of social efficiency is reversed.
In such a case, as represented in Figure 2, the traditional elites are empowered in period
t+ 2, as λt+2 > λt+1.
Figure 2: Cultural Revival
t t+ 1 t+ 2 Time
λt
qt
1
Horse race
In sum, by inducing cultural change, the “traditional” (type 1) elites increase their power
over time, in spite of cultural values and institutions that were initially antagonistic to them.
Institutions move too slowly to reverse this cultural change, and eventually the dominant
culture is consistent with the interests of the traditional elites. Only then do institutions
change to even further increase the political power of the traditional elites. While elites have
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no power to directly alter institutions in their favor, they are ultimately able to do so by
inducing cultural changes in their favor. And once culture sufficiently changes, institutions
follow suit.
Throughout the paper, we made no assumption on how civil society forms expectation
on the future. Yet this affects the time and resources that parents devote to child rearing,
as well as the joint trajectory of culture and institutions. Hence, in an extended version
of this model, the expectations of civil society could be strategically manipulated by elites
seeking to increase their future bargaining weights. Alternative strategies may arise in such
an extended version of the model, where the elites not only over-provide public goods,
but also indoctrinate the masses, say through the media, in order to change their beliefs
about the future. Such an extension would strengthen the main results, while generating
new implications on the role of media and information dissemination in generating cultural
revivals.
3.2 Exogenous Shocks and Cultural Revivals
Exogenous shocks can also trigger cultural revivals. This is what happened in the study by
Fouka (2020), where a new policy regarding teaching German in schools triggered a revival of
German identity. This was also the case in the Ottoman Empire, Qing China, and Tokugawa
Japan, where contact with the West ignited a revival of long dormant cultural beliefs (for
further details on our historical narrative, see Appendix B). In this light, we establish the
following result:
Proposition 3 An increase in the marginal utility of the agents from a higher provision of
good 2 (φ2) may increase the likelihood of cultural revivals.
Proof. The proof is available in Appendix A.3.
This result indicates, first, that cultural revivals may be more likely to occur when the
“advanced” sector becomes relatively more efficient. When the complementarity between
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private consumption and public provision φ2 increases, civil society has greater incentive to
transmit culture complementary to good 2. Good 2 is all the more valuable in consumption
and production decisions, and also more efficient in helping the agents to transmit their
cultural type. At the same time, however, type 1 elites have more to lose, as they now provide
a less efficient good. Their willingness to curb the trajectory of cultural change in their favor
is thus greater. This explains why what could appear as “efficient” societal changes that
promotes “better” modes of individual production and consumption can have deleterious
effects on institutional and cultural change. Instead of leading to efficient institutional
changes, it may reinforce the political power of the elites who promote less efficient modes
of production. Such reforms may also lead to a reversal in the trajectory of cultural norms
when they trigger a cultural revival. Although this result does not always obtain in the
general case—due to possible non-convexities—we present a relatively general application of
the model in Appendix A.3 where it necessarily holds under a simple set of conditions on
the parameters.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the failure of societies
to adopt beneficial institutions—even when adoption entails undeniable efficiency gains and
is in the interest of the politically powerful—and why these failures so often coincide with a
rise in traditionalist ideology or culture.
We propose an explanation that highlights the interplay between cultural beliefs and
institutions. In our model, forward-looking elites may over-provide public goods associated
with a more traditional (less efficient) sector that benefits their interests. This investment
results in more agents generating cultural beliefs complementary to the provision of the
traditional good, which in turn increases the future political power of the “traditional”
elites. Hence, forward-looking elites increase investment, political power, and the cultural
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capital associated with the more traditional sector of the economy, in the process generating
a revival of beliefs associated with an outdated economic environment.
The insights provided by the model offer an explanation for why institutional reforms
by themselves have historically not been the elixir of economic development. This has im-
plications for various 21st-century efforts to impose democratic or economic institutions on
societies whose ideologies are not equipped to handle them. For instance, attempts at in-
stilling democracy in formerly autocratic states in the Middle East (e.g., Iraq and Egypt)
ended in dysfunction. Likewise, Russia experienced massive corruption when implementing
capitalist reforms following the fall of Communism. In these cases, societies that were cul-
turally unready for massive institutional change were unable to adopt the intended changes
in a functional manner.
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Appendices
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The fraction of agents of type 1 it period t+ 1 can be written as:
qt+1 = qt + qt(1− qt)(1− d2t )− (1− qt)qt(1− d1t ). (A.1)
The second term in the RHS above gives the fraction of children raised by type 2 parents
that become type 1 adults. The last term in the RHS above gives the fraction of children
raised as type 1 that become type 2 adults. Hence, it is direct from (A.1) that the cultural
dynamics can be written as:
qt+1 = qt + qt(1− qt)(d1t − d2t ). (A.2)
This establishes the first point of Proposition 1.
Relative to the second set of results in the proposition, first, we write the optimization
problem of an agent of type i:
max
{xik,τ ik}k=1,...,M ,{xid,τ id}
U i({xik, τ ik}k=1,...,M) + αEuic(hi(τ id, xid, git)), (A.3)
subject to
e({xik, τ ik}k=1,...,M , {xid, τ id}) ≤ W, (A.4)
given that the child’s utility—as expected by the parent—is given in (8):
Euic(d
i
t) = {dit + (1− dit)qt}u(g1,et+1, g2,et+1) + (1− dit)(1− qt)u, (A.5)
with dit given in (2).
Hence, denoting µ > 0 the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (A.4), we
can write the first-order condition associated with τ 1d as:
α
∂h
∂τ 1d
(1− qt){u1(g1,et+1, g2,et+1)− u} − µ
∂e
∂τ 1d
= 0 (A.6)
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when the solution is interior. Similarly, the first-order condition associated with x1d can be
written as:
α
∂h
∂x1d
(1− qt){u1(g1,et+1, g2,et+1)− u} − µ
∂e
∂x1d
= 0 (A.7)
when the solution is interior. We assume that this is always the case in the remainder of
the proof, and we denote τ i∗d and x
i∗
d the optimal time and monetary investments in child
rearing.
We deduce from the first-order conditions (A.6) and (A.7) that τ i∗d and x
i∗
d are increasing
in git.
Indeed, when the provision of g1 is higher in period t, then so is the marginal benefit, for
a type 1 parent, of devoting time and resources to child rearing. This follows directly from
the assumption (9) made in the main text:
∂2hi
∂τ id∂g
i
t
> 0, and
∂2hi
∂xid∂g
i
t
> 0. (A.8)
Hence, d1∗t increases with g
1
t , while d
2∗
t is not affected. Therefore, qt+1 increases with g
1
t . By
a similar reasoning, we deduce that qt+1 decreases with g
2
t .
We now study the case where the marginal utility φ1 of a higher provision of good 1
increases for type 1 agents. In such a case, type 1 parents expect a higher utility in the next
period from being type 1. More formally:
∂U1p
∂g1
=
∂u1(g1,et+1, g
1,e
t+1)
∂g1
= φ1 > 0, (A.9)
where the first equality follows from the envelop theorem. Hence,
u1(g1,et+1, g
1,e
t+1)
∂φ1
> 0 (A.10)
holds.16
When the marginal utility of good 1 (φ1) increases, then so does the marginal benefit,
for a type 1 parent, of devoting time and resources to child rearing. For a fixed public good
provision scheme (g1t , g
2
t ), then, qt+1 necessarily increases with (φ
1). Using similar reasoning,
we deduce that qt+1 decreases with φ
2.
16Indeed, since
∂u1(g1,et+1,g
1,e
t+1)
∂g1 = φ
1, then it must be that u1(g1, g2) = φ1g1 +K(g2), with K(g2) a function of
g2.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Elites bargain over the available resources. Hence, in period t, the provision of the public
goods (g1t , g
2
t ) maximizes the function (5), given that in each period, elites jointly face the
budget constraint (7).
We deduce that the optimal provision of the public goods, in period t, solves the following
first-order condition:
λt
v′(g1t )
v(g1t )
−(1−λt)v
′(g2t )
v(g2t )
+δ2ηz′(qt+1)
∂qt+1
∂g1t
[log(v(g1,et+2(λ
e
t+2))−log(v(g2,et+2(λet+2))] = 0, (A.11)
given that
∂qt+1
∂g1t
= qt(1− qt){dh
1
dg1t
+
dh2
dg2t
}, (A.12)
with
dh1
dg1t
=
∂h1
∂g1t
+
∂h1
∂x1d
∂x1∗d
∂g1t
+
∂h1
∂τ 1d
∂τ 1∗d
∂g1t
. (A.13)
We use the notation hi for hi(τ i∗d , x
i∗
d , g
i
t) as a matter of simplification in this proof. As
established in the proof of Proposition 1, a higher provision of good 1 positively affects the
effort of transmission of the agents of type 1. From Assumption (9), it also complements the
time and resources that parents devote to child rearing. Hence, dh
1
dg1t
> 0. From a similarly
reasoning, dh
2
dg2t
> 0. We deduce that
∂qt+1
∂g1t
> 0. (A.14)
The concavity of the problem of the elites is not necessarily guaranteed in the general
case. Indeed, non-linearities may arise when we take the derivative of the last term in the
RHS of (A.11) with respect to g1t . However, in the case where η is equal to zero (i.e. the
frictions in institutional change are maximum), then the problem is necessarily concave, as
the derivative of the two first terms in the LHS of (A.11) is negative:
λt
v′′(g1t )v(g
1
t )− v′(g1t )2
v(g1t )
2
− (1− λt)−v
′′(g2t )v(g
2
t )− v′(g2t )2
v(g2t )
2
< 0. (A.15)
Hence, in the case where η is sufficiently small, i.e. when there are enough frictions in
institutional change, then concavity is necessarily verified. The Nash bargaining of the elites
admits a unique solution (g1∗t , g
2∗
t ).
Based on (A.11), when the elites form higher expectations over λet+2, the marginal ben-
efit of provisioning good g1t , in period t, is higher. Indeed, the term [log(v(g
1,e
t+2(λ
e
t+2)) −
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log(v(g2,et+2(λ
e
t+2))] increases with λ
e
t+2, while the rest of the first-order condition is not af-
fected. We deduce that g1∗t increases with λ
e
t+2, while g
2∗
t = r − g1∗t decreases with λet+2.
Finally, from the proof of Proposition 1, we know that qt+1 increases with the provision
of good 1, and decreases with that of good 2. Hence, combining the last result established
above with Proposition 1, we deduce that qt+1 increases with λ
e
t+2. In order to emphasize
the dependency of qt+1 on λ
e
t+2, we will denote qt+1 ≡ qt+1(λet+2) in the rest of this proof.
The institutional dynamics provided in the main text (12) is:
λt+1 = λt + t + ηz(qt). (A.16)
Hence, from periods t + 1 to t + 2 – given that elites have rational expectations – the
institutions change, so as to solve the following fixed point equation:
λt+2 = λt+1 + t+1 + ηz(qt+1(λt+2)), (A.17)
Since z(.) increases with qt+1, and qt+1 increases with the rational expectations of the
elites λt+2, the equation above may admit several solutions where the expectations of the
elites about the future institutions are rational. The multiplicity depends, in particular, on
the convexity of the functional forms z(.) and v(.).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
When the elites bargain over the available resources, the public policy solves the following
first-order condition, as explained in the previous proof:
λt
v′(g1t )
v(g1t )
−(1−λt)v
′(g2t )
v(g2t )
+δ2ηz′(qt+1)
∂qt+1
∂g1t
[log(v(g1,et+2(λ
e
t+2))−log(v(g2,et+2(λet+2))] = 0, (A.18)
given that
∂qt+1
∂g1t
= qt(1− qt){dh
1
dg1t
+
dh2
dg2t
}, (A.19)
with
dh1
dg1t
=
∂h1
∂g1t
+
∂h1
∂x1d
∂x1∗d
∂g1t
+
∂h1
∂τ 1d
∂τ 1∗d
∂g1t
. (A.20)
Hence, the existence of a revival outcome depends on the magnitude of the coefficient
δ2ηz′(qt+1)
∂qt+1
∂g1t
. Indeed, when this coefficient increases, then the marginal benefit of pro-
visioning good 1—given that the elites expect λet+2 > 1/2—is larger. There is more scope
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for an elite bargaining outcome which results in an institutional outcome where λet+2 > 1/2.
Hence, the likelihood of a revival increases.17
Consider now an increase in φ2, the marginal utility, for the agent of type 2, of the
provision of the public good 2.
From Proposition 1, then, we deduce that qt+1 is expected to decrease with φ
2. Hence,
by concavity of z(.), we expect z′(qt+1) to be higher when φ2 increases. Since φ2 affects the
transmission strategy of the agents of type 2, however, it is not clear how φ2 will affect ∂qt+1
∂g1t
in the general case. This is why, in the general case, we cannot make a clear cut prediction
for the effect of a higher value of φ2 on the existence of cultural revivals.
In any case, when φ2 increases, since z′(qt+1) is expected to increase as well, then the
coefficient δ2ηz′(qt+1)
∂qt+1
∂g1t
may increase. This explains why it is impossible to rule out the
result that revival outcomes may be more likely when φ2 increases. This concludes the proof
of Proposition 3.
Finally, in order to support the claim that the result of Proposition 3 is not necessarily
driven by the concavity of the function z(.), we apply the model to a case that stays relatively
general. We will demonstrate that in the example presented below, when φ2 increases, so
does the likelihood of cultural revivals.
Example: As an application of the model, we consider the following specification for
the utility function of an individual of type 1:
U1 = U1p + αEu1c(d1t ), (A.21)
with U1p = φ1g1t + ln(c1t ) and,Eu1c(d1t ) = {(1− d1t )qt + d1t}(φ1g1∗,et+1 + ln(c1∗,et+1 )) + (1− d1t )(1− qt)u, (A.22)
with d1t = h
1(x1t , g
1
t ) = f(g
1
t )x
1
t , x
1
t the resources invested in child rearing (we assume no
time investments here), c1t the private consumption, and f(.) an increasing, bounded, and
concave function. Additionally, g1∗,et+1 and c
1∗,e
t+1 respectively denote the expected provision of
good 1 in period t+ 1, and the expected private consumption of the child in t+ 1.
The budget constraint faced by an individual is simply:
c1t + x
1
t ≤ W. (A.23)
17Observe that, symmetrically, there is also more scope for an elite bargaining which results in an institutional
outcome where λet+2 < 1/2 when δ
2ηz′(qt+1)
∂qt+1
∂g1t
increases.
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Furthermore, the functional form (A.21) satisfies the assumptions made in the main text, as
∂U1p
∂g1t
= φ1, (A.24)
and h1(x1t , g
1
t ) = f(g
1
t )x
1
t is such that∂h
1
∂g1t
> 0, and
∂2h1
∂x1t∂g
1
t
> 0.
(A.25)
Similarly, we posit that for the agents of type 2,
U2 = φ2g2t + ln(c
2
t ) + α{(φ2g2∗,et+1 + ln(c2∗,et+1 ))((1− d2t )(1− qt) + d2t ) + (1− d2t )qtu}, (A.26)
with d2t = h
2(g2t , x
2
t ) = f(g
2
t )x
2
t , and x
2
t the resources invested in child rearing (we still assume
no time investments), and c2t the private consumption. The budget constraint faced by an
individual of type 2 is also:
c2t + x
2
t ≤ W. (A.27)
From the optimization problem of a parent of type 1, we deduce that x1∗t , the optimal
investments in child rearing, solve the following first-order condition:
− 1
W − x1t
+ h(g1t )(1− qt)α{φ1g1,et+1 + ln(c1,et+1)− u}. (A.28)
The problem is concave, hence the resources invested in child rearing are uniquely deter-
mined. Consistently with the results established in the general case, it is direct that x1∗t
increases with g1t and φ
1. Furthermore, the cultural dynamics are given by:
qt+1 = qt + qt(1− qt)(x1∗t f(g1t )− x2∗t f(g2t )). (A.29)
It follows that, in this case,
∂qt+1
∂g1t
= qt(1− qt){x1∗t f ′(g1t ) +
∂x1∗t
∂g1t
f(g1t ) + x
2∗
t f
′(g2t ) +
∂x2∗t
∂g2t
f(g2t )}. (A.30)
Furthermore, from the first-order condition (A.28), we deduce that:
h′(g1t )(1− qt)α{φ1g1,et+1 + ln(c1,et+1)− u} −
1
(W − x1∗d )2
∂x1∗t
∂g1t
= 0. (A.31)
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Hence, by differentiating the previous expression with respect to φ1, we obtain that:
h′(g1t )(1− qt)αg1,et+1 −
2
(W − x1∗d )3
∂x1∗d
∂g1t
∂x1∗d
∂φ1
− 1
(W − x1∗d )2
∂2x1∗t
∂φ1∂g1t
= 0. (A.32)
We obtain the expressions of
∂x1∗d
∂g1t
and
∂x1∗d
∂φ1
by differentiating the FOC associated with the
maximization program of an agent of type 1.
The sign of
∂2x1∗t
∂φ1∂g1t
is not simply obtained, since the two first terms in the RHS of (A.32)
have opposite signs. However, it is easy to find a condition over the parameters, such that
the sign of
∂x1∗d
∂φ1
is fixed. We find that when the altruistic concerns of the parent α are low
enough, then
∂x1∗d
∂φ1
> 0 (A.33)
necessarily holds.18 And from a similar reasoning, when α is low enough,
∂2x2∗t
∂φ2∂g2t
> 0. (A.34)
At this stage, we can reconsider the effect of an increase in φ2 on the magnitude of the
coefficient δ2ηz′(qt+1)
∂qt+1
∂g1t
.
First, since an increase in φ2 decreases qt+1, it increases z
′(qt+1). Type 1 elites have more
to lose from institutional changes, as they now provide a less efficient good. Their willingness
to curb the trajectory of cultural change in their favor is thus greater for that reason.
Second, we find that:
∂2qt+1
∂φ2∂g1t
= qt(1− qt){∂x
2∗
∂φ2
f ′(g2t ) +
∂2x2∗t
∂φ2g2t
f(g2t )} > 0 (A.35)
when α is sufficiently low. Civil society has greater incentive to transmit culture complemen-
tary to good 2. Good 2 is all the more valuable in consumption and production decisions,
and also more efficient in helping the agents to transmit their cultural type, as ∂
2qt+1
∂φ2∂g1t
> 0.
Hence, we deduce that
∂
∂φ2
[δ2ηz′(qt+1)
∂qt+1
∂g1t
] > 0. (A.36)
Unambiguously, when α is sufficiently low, the magnitude of the coefficient δ2ηz′(qt+1)
∂qt+1
∂g1t
increases with φ2. In this example, then, an increase in φ2 makes cultural revivals more
likely.
18The formal condition on α is α < 1
2Wh(φ1r+ln(W )−u) with h the maximum value of the function h(., .), which
exists as f(.) is bounded by assumption.
33
For Online Publication
B Historical Narrative
In this Appendix, we provide historical detail regarding the “cultural revivals” in the Ot-
toman Empire, Imperial China, and Tokugawa Japan. In all three cases, societies faced with
a changing world responded with cultural and institutional changes favoring the “traditional
way” of doing things. The Ottomans certainly recognized they had fallen behind the West,
but their operating premise was the inferiority of anything Western—a belief that was justifi-
able in the sixteenth century context in which it emerged. The “traditionalist reform period”
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was built on this ideal of Ottoman superiority
(Shaw 1976, p. 175). Reformers of this era viewed Ottoman failure vis-a`-vis the West as a
failure to apply the techniques and organizational forms employed under the glorious reign of
Su¨leyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66), a period often viewed as the apex of Ottoman power.
The most important and skilled writer on Ottoman stagnation was Koc¸i Beg, an intimate
advisor of Sultan Murad IV (r. 1623–40). Throughout his writings—many of which were
used extensively by later writers of the genre—the concept of a past “Golden Age” under
Su¨leyman was a dominant theme (or, the “imagined perfection” of the era before Su¨leyman,
as denoted by Colin Imber [2016]). In effect, there was no desire or urgency during these
early reform attempts to study and understand Western techniques and institutions (Howard
1988; Dale 2010; Iyigun 2015).
Imperial China responded to crises similarly. In the face of two contemporaneous crises—
the rapid decimation of Chinese forces by the British in the First Opium War (1839–42) and
numerous internal revolts—the Qing realized the need to modernize their economy and mili-
tary. The Qing responded to the mid-nineteenth century crises with a set of policies known as
the “Tongzhi Restoration” (1862–74), a period in which modernizing policies were enacted.
Yet, these policies were implemented via the old, conservative bureaucratic institutions, led
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by scholars steeped in cultural norms associated with traditional Confucian ideology (Wright
1957). Chinese “borrowing” of Western know-how and technology but not ideology or in-
stitutions is summarized by the famous formula: “Chinese learning as the basis; Western
learning for practical use” (Wright 1957, p. 1). A key element of the Restorations was
the so-called “Self-Strengthening Movement,” which discouraged private enterprise, dispar-
aged commerce and foreign trade, emphasized agriculture above all other forms of economic
activity, encouraged frugality, and discouraged investment in infrastructure in favor of “tra-
ditional” handicrafts (Wright 1957, ch. 8–9). As a result, private modern industry had no
legal status in China until the 20th century (Brown 1979; Ma 2004). These policies resulted
in the loss of leadership in one of China’s most important industries, sericulture (silk produc-
tion), to Japan, whose Meiji government implemented Western reforms strongly encouraging
private enterprise (despite its negative effects on traditional manufacturers) and important
infrastructure such as the telegraph (Ma 2005).
In Tokugawa Japan, reform attempts began in the early eighteenth century, primarily
in response to political economy disruptions associated with the rise of urban commercial-
ism (Jansen 2000, p. 238–9). Their most prominent reforms included renovations in the
educational system and the intellectual realm based on the orthodoxy of Chi Hsi Confu-
cianism. Much like the Ottoman and Chinese reformers, Tokugawa reformers believed that
traditionalist morals and political standards were correct in spite of an obviously changing
world. What went wrong, according to this idea, was the failure of society to live up to these
traditionalist standards (Duus 1976, p. 53).
When Ottoman and Chinese reforms complementary to more modern institutions and
technologies did come—the 19th-century Ottoman Tanzimat Reforms and the Chinese re-
sponse to failure in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95)—it was too late, and the Ottoman and
Chinese Empires failed soon thereafter. Yet, cultural revivals are not necessarily permanent.
They can also be temporary. The transition from Tokugawa to Meiji Japan provides an
historical example of such a temporary revival.
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Japan’s Meiji Restoration of the mid-19th century was a wholesale reform initiative based
on an acknowledgment that the traditional social, political, and economic organization of
Japanese society was inadequate to deal with the modern challenges of adopting Western
technologies and methods of production. The transformative nature of the Meiji Restoration
was manifested in the degree to which intellectual elites began to study and analyze the ways
of the West. Beginning in the 1850s, Japanese writers were increasingly sent abroad to study.
Many more learned about the West by studying books. These writers and scholars emerged
as the intellectual elite in the 1860s and 1870s, replacing those versed in the Confucian
style. It was this group that would produce the translations and original works that would
ultimately disseminate knowledge of the West to the educated classes (Duus 1976, p. 87).
By sending their children to Europe for education, members of the Japanese elite exposed
their children to both Western techniques and the Western cultural ideals that enabled these
techniques to function. Moreover, one of the most significant achievements of the Meiji era
was the expansion and changing content of formal education and its interplay with other
Meiji transformations in the institutional and economic realms. The introduction of universal
education based on both the general and the technical was widely accepted. Education
increasingly played a role in Meiji government policy, with the government spending more
on education as a share of national income than many of the Western powers (Allen 1981,
p. 2, 3).
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